JUNE 12: The first picture is happening in Lagos where youths are having a Hunger protest.

The second picture is happening in Abia, Aba precisely where youths are having a 2 million man match in support of Gov Alex Otti good governance

The two events are happening simultaneously and on the same day.

BREAKING:
The Alliance of SAHEL States (AES) has introduced its national anthem, marking a significant milestone in the establishment of a borderless nation comprising Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. This integration enables the free movement of people and businesses, supported by a single, unified army. The three heads of state simultaneously launched and sang the AES national anthem. As an African, do you think the AES embodies the future and the principles that Africans stand for?

Your thoughts on Africa time

Are Brands Shortchanging The Southeast?

We pride ourselves on having a large market in the Southeast. Numbers and statistics support this claim. When I was in the telecom industry, Onitsha was a big revenue center for the telcos.

However, we cannot say that brands benefiting from the huge Southeast market have shown enough good faith in their social investments decision-making and this is baffling.

Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt usually receive a large chunk of corporate sponsorships from major Nigerian brands, to the neglect of the Southeast market, which can be likened to the goose that lays the golden egg.

We once had MTN as the title sponsor of Enugwu-Ukwu Igu-Aro and the other associated festivals. That relationship stopped and no other brand has bothered to throw their muscle behind the rich cultural fest. Globacom sponsors the Onitsha Ofala Festival. However, other brands are yet to step in as co-sponsors to help blow the festival the same way they have done with the Ojude Oba festival in Ijebu-Ode, Ogun state.

These fliers are just a few examples of how other brands have helped to activate the Ojude-Oba festival.

Organizing world-class festivals requires a lot of resources which only brands can provide. We people of the Southeast are demanding more from brands that are generating tons of revenue from the Southeast. Fair is fair.

We are simply asking for a re-think of the corporate social investments (CSI) strategies of major Nigerian brands to also favour the Southeast which also generates the revenues for them.

The argument that insecurity in the Southeast is one of the reasons why brands chose to stay away from CSI investments is not completely true. Insecurity may have impacted social life but people are still making calls and using data in the Southeast so the telcos can’t complain. On the Mondays of sit-at-home, I can bet that data and call usages increase as people idle away at home. On weekends, and even weekdays, bars and nightclubs are still banging so beverage companies are smiling. The financial services sector is thriving despite the security challenges. POS operators are almost lined up inch after inch in our communities. Banks are still declaring trillions of Naira in profits.

During festive periods such as Easter, New Yam, and Christmas seasons when these festivals take place. It’s choc-a-block and bumper-to-bumper traffic in the Southeast. So a bit more CSI gaze towards the Southeast by the brands won’t be a bad idea. The tokenism approach should be discarded because it’s good business for them.

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WOW

Zlatan revealed that Davido supportted his business with over 20 million Naira . He bought his $1500 merch for everyone in 30BG gang .

It didn’t end there , he went with it to America and wore it almost everyday . He promoted Zlatan’s clothing line despite being a PUMA Ambassador

001 is a man with the Heart of Gold .

Make him buy one for Shatta abeg .

“The $100 million we invested in Iroko TV was a mistake. If I had another opportunity, I would not do it again.”

Jason Njoku shares his terrible, brutal experience running Iroko TV.

Let's read him:

STREAMING IN NIGERIA. DID THE MARKET WIN?

Iroko’s first funding was in August 2011; our mandate was to build a large streaming business in Nigeria.

Tiger Global believed that one of the largest growth areas would be online entertainment, and like most content, the winners would be local content in large domestic markets.

They invested $200 million in Netflix back in 2010 and then invested in IVI in Russia, YY in China, Netmovies in Brazil, and us in Nigeria.

With super-expensive data bundles and inelegant payment options (I remember waiting for Interswitch to enable us to integrate), our market took a while to mature. In most opportunities, you can be too early or too late; only in hindsight can you gauge when the best time to strike would be. iROKOtv was very early when we launched in 2011, but we were fortunate that there was a ready-made international market in the diaspora who were willing to pay and able to overcome any technical hurdles (payment/bandwidth/devices) to enable us to at least generate a sizable income.

We actually waited until 2015 (four years post-launch), building the product, securing a sizable content library, and assembling a team to attempt to take on Nigeria and Africa. Between the revenues we generated and the venture capital we raised ($35 million) over the first ten years, we easily spent $100 million trying to win.

But we weren’t winning; we weren’t really losing either. We were just there, in full survival mode, operating in the toughest conditions possible. Streaming, even domestically, is a scale game.

Africa wasn’t immune to those costs. It’s incredibly expensive across marketing, content, delivery, and product platforms. Our largest, most serious competitors were Showmax, Netflix, Amazon, and Iflix. Collectively, they easily invested $1 billion or more from 2015 to 2023.

During that period, we often had tense board meetings about why iROKOtv wasn’t succeeding; it was challenging to feel that all my hard work and dedication were constantly reduced to “you’re not doing enough”.

We have been, and remain, the most aggressive in trying to distribute content across Nigeria—deploying hundreds of manned kiosks, teams of outbound contact centre agents, creating agency networks, adjusting our product to prioritise Android downloads, and pioneering peer-to-peer file sharing.

At one point, it dawned on me, and I finally shot back in a board meeting: if iROKOtv was losing, could they point to someone who was beating us? In the startup world, that’s usually the outcome of underperformance.

You are simply being out-executed by a better-capitalised or higher-performing startup. In this case, there simply wasn’t anything anyone could point to to establish that.

So my simple assertion was that the market was winning. In 2019, we went out to fundraise; for the first time, we used a bank, Stanbic IBTP, to support that.

We were looking for $10-20 million to keep pushing into and across Africa with our outbound, agency, and kiosk models.

I believed my tales of survival would inspire the (primarily) PE investors that we were going to be the eventual winners in a brutal, long-fought civil streaming war. Instead, they all largely concluded that perhaps there was no market there, that the unit economics were simply not viable at any reasonable scale.

What they were all interested in was the ROK content, TV channels, and distribution business. It was straightforward (fewer than 30 employees), had clear revenue recognition (billion-dollar paid TV platforms – DStv, Multichoice, SKY, etc., with 3-5 year contracts in non-local currencies), and was amassing a sizable IP library funded by the same paid TV platforms. Once we separated out ROK, it was clear where the value lay in Iroko. It represented 80% of revenues and 25% of costs. EBITA margins of 35-40% were achieved without even realising it.

The outcome of that fundraise was the $25 million partial exit (Iroko sold her shares; Mrs Njoku remains a significant shareholder in the studio) to Vivendi/Canal+.

We closed in July 2019.

Before the end of 2019, we had distributed $5 million as a special dividend and were primed to take on the world.

Then COVID-19 happened. Streaming temporarily boomed in the West (our North American business tripled in subscriber growth), while Nigeria closed borders and grappled with peculiar economic principles (devaluations, FX windows, etc.).

The local market in Nigeria simply collapsed. We saw it and stubbornly decided to keep investing and doubling down until we were all tapped out, having burnt through most of the post-exit capital. To save iROKOtv, we considered crowdfunding, an AIM LSE listing (you could raise $10-30 million easily back then) with relatively little revenue but a strong narrative.

In the end, we raised $1.1 million in convertible notes, then recapped the company a year later and paid it back.

In 2023, we finally accepted there was no market for paid premium services and exited Nigeria. We haven’t processed any Naira payments there in almost two years.

As I humbly survey the wreckage of the last 15 years of streaming in Nigeria and Africa, it’s clear our (then $2k GDP per capita) was too small to support even a $5/mo product. It’s clear this wasn’t even a question of capital.

Showmax alone continues to pour tens, if not hundreds, of millions to make it work. But the global giants tapped out last year; their costs (content and marketing) were clearly unsustainably high, and their product needed to be localised to make sense and actually work; it’s just not how platforms sustainably scale.

So I wasn’t surprised when either Amazon or Netflix rolled back their considerable investments in Nigeria. $5/mo is a luxury I doubt even 250k can reliably afford in Nigeria.

You can see the impact of what GOtv and DStv are suffering at the hands of the market. It’s okay that we tried and failed. It’s okay that we accept the limitations in the domestic market we find ourselves in. Did it need $1B+ to figure this out?

Absolutely not. I believe, with my newfound knowledge, that iROKOtv could have reached the same conclusions with $5-10 million versus the $100 million+ we ended up investing.

In hindsight, streaming wasn’t the winning model for Nollywood in Nigeria. Content, channels, and distribution were.

With the economics that business had in 2018, we could have shut down iROKOtv and her $5 million/year in losses and either listed it or just had a fantastically profitable business.

But I was a believer and walked away from millions of dollars in personal liquidity to put it all in to build streaming in Africa.

My lessons were expensive, and that’s why I am so consistent in telling founders not to over-raise.

I am not surprised by the story of Obi from Kobo360; I lobbied him pre-$30m raise not to raise too much capital or later on to seek a merger with his nearest competitor whilst they were engaged in a brutal price war.

The unit economics and payment cycles were brutal, and capital wasn’t going to dramatically change the market dynamics, and it appeared that no one was really going to win that market. It’s only with deep, lived, and expensive experience that I can glance at unit economics coldly and get a feel for whether, with the usual macro turbulence, a startup has a better chance at long-term success.

Nigeria is currently a massive drag on the entire operating business of Multichoice. Their most recent H1 reports indicate.

Reminder that this is the largest pay platform in Africa, which is currently being acquired in a $2.8B deal.

The Labour Party (LP) national caretaker committee, led by Senator Nenadi Usman, has expressed its support for the party’s 2023 presidential candidate, Peter Obi, in engaging in ongoing coalition discussions with various opposition leaders in the country.

Even if the Labour Party did not officially back Peter Obi, I believe he will still join the coalition, as that is the only way to unseat Tinubu in 2027.

As I mentioned before, many politicians are considering switching parties and are simply waiting for the coalition to be finalized.

The governor of Benue State has already hinted at his willingness to join the coalition, and it seems likely he will do so.

In 2027, Peter Obi could emerge as our new president or vice president under this new coalition party—mark my words.

As a political journalist, I have a clear understanding of the current dynamics. The APC is also facing internal crises, and it is possible that Shettima may not return as vice president in 2027.

Many people are letting emotions cloud their judgment when it comes to the recent drama surrounding Veekee James and a designer allegedly copying her work. While it’s natural to defend someone you admire, business—especially in today’s social media age—operates on strategy, not sentiment.

Here’s the truth: in fashion, smaller brands that mimic successful designers can pose a serious threat, no matter how established the original brand is. It’s not just about who came first or who is more “original.” Sometimes, the imitator uses the attention from that comparison to launch themselves into the spotlight.

That seems to be what’s happening here. The emerging designer may appear less skilled or less known, but he’s cleverly positioning himself to benefit from the controversy. He’s using Veekee’s fame as a springboard, and honestly, it’s a smart—if risky—move.

It only takes one celebrity endorsement to change everything. If a major name decides to give him a shot, and he delivers a bold, fresh design, the internet will explode. People will forget about who copied whom. Instead, they’ll say, “Wow, look what he did!” And unfortunately, Veekee could still catch criticism in the fallout.

That’s why I believe Veekee should’ve played it differently. Publicly reacting gave him the validation he needed. If she had stayed silent and let her legal team quietly handle things, he would’ve had less momentum. Instead, now he gets to be “the guy who copied Veekee”—and that alone could drive his visibility and sales.

In public relations, some individuals act like leeches. They latch onto bigger names, hoping to gain relevance by association. This designer might seem harmless now, but his entire strategy relies on the Veekee brand to boost his own.

And let’s be honest, the internet is emotional and unpredictable. The designer seems to know this—and he’s aimed his strategy squarely at a Nigerian audience that loves an underdog story. If he pulls off one standout piece for a celebrity, the same fans who supported Veekee could turn around and say, “See? He’s even better.”

Bottom line: don’t underestimate a small brand just because they look like they’re copying. Sometimes, that’s exactly the plan. In this game, staying calm, strategic, and legally smart is the best defense.

Veekee didn’t need to respond with emotion. She needed to respond with silence and strength. That alone would have disrupted his plan entirely.

The magic is in the margins, and they owned every one of them.

Best Supporting Actor (Proudly sponsored by Indomie) – Gabriel Afolayan in Clarence Peter's 'Inside Life'

Best Supporting Actress (Proudly sponsored by NIVEA) – Mercy Aigbe in Farmer's Bride

Scene-stealers, soul-shakers. At #AMVCA11, they proved that supporting roles don’t play second fiddle — they set the stage ablaze.

#AMVCA

The first war of 2025 has officially begun. India vs. Pakistan.

It started with a sudden exchange of gunfire between soldiers at the Kashmir border.

Now, here’s what that means.

Kashmir is a region both India and Pakistan claim as theirs. It has been a point of serious tension for over 70 years. Sometimes things go quiet, and other times, like now, it explodes.

The border area called the Line of Control is heavily guarded. But a few days ago, shots were fired. Soldiers died.

But this is not just a small fight. This is war.

India recently removed a law that gave Kashmir special treatment. That decision angered many people, especially in Pakistan. The Pakistani government saw it as a direct threat and responded fast.

Now, both countries have sent more troops to the border. Fighter jets, missiles, and the world is paying attention.

Why does this matter?

Because India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons. If this escalates, it could affect not just South Asia but the entire world.

And there's more.

China supports Pakistan. The U.S. supports India. Russia is staying quiet. If these bigger powers get involved, it could turn into something even more dangerous.

Also, India is a major player in the world’s tech and trade industries. If war continues, prices may rise. Global markets could feel the shock. And millions of people could be affected, even outside Asia.

2025 is just getting started. And already, the world is standing on the edge of something serious.

The political transfer window is still open. APC dey sign top strikers, PDP gets management issues like Man Utd, and financial problems like Barcelona, they either recruit young players from their academy or rely on sponsorship deals to sign some defenders, to avoid conceding too many goals, because they seem not prepared for the 2027 PCL (political champions League)

Ever since APC signed BAT, the club has been running the street and the acquisition of Wike on loan has really proven great for the team formation. He helped them beat his former club in Edo.

All eyes are on Osun where the newly acquired defensive midfielder (Sheriff) and left winger (Okowa) will be looking forward to forming a formidable galacticos with Wike and Dapo. According to the club CEO (BAT) negotiation to sign the Osun state skillful midfielder to be backup for Sheriff is at its Zenith.

We look forward to seeing the strategy that would be deployed by the LP FC this time around as they are in serious negotiation to sign Kano state no 9 to support their attack in the upcoming 2027 PCL.

On the other side, veteran goalkeeper El Rufai is trying to recruit a formidable squad that may include the likes of veteran defender Atiku to create a new Club or acquire an old club for the 2027 PCL. While attackers like Saraki and Tambawal had been out injured, they have started personal training to be fit for the next season PCL, and PDP, LP, and APC are monitoring their progress. Stay tuned for more updates!

#copied
Sochinwa Robert