“The $100 million we invested in Iroko TV was a mistake. If I had another opportunity, I would not do it again.”

Jason Njoku shares his terrible, brutal experience running Iroko TV.

Let's read him:

STREAMING IN NIGERIA. DID THE MARKET WIN?

Iroko’s first funding was in August 2011; our mandate was to build a large streaming business in Nigeria.

Tiger Global believed that one of the largest growth areas would be online entertainment, and like most content, the winners would be local content in large domestic markets.

They invested $200 million in Netflix back in 2010 and then invested in IVI in Russia, YY in China, Netmovies in Brazil, and us in Nigeria.

With super-expensive data bundles and inelegant payment options (I remember waiting for Interswitch to enable us to integrate), our market took a while to mature. In most opportunities, you can be too early or too late; only in hindsight can you gauge when the best time to strike would be. iROKOtv was very early when we launched in 2011, but we were fortunate that there was a ready-made international market in the diaspora who were willing to pay and able to overcome any technical hurdles (payment/bandwidth/devices) to enable us to at least generate a sizable income.

We actually waited until 2015 (four years post-launch), building the product, securing a sizable content library, and assembling a team to attempt to take on Nigeria and Africa. Between the revenues we generated and the venture capital we raised ($35 million) over the first ten years, we easily spent $100 million trying to win.

But we weren’t winning; we weren’t really losing either. We were just there, in full survival mode, operating in the toughest conditions possible. Streaming, even domestically, is a scale game.

Africa wasn’t immune to those costs. It’s incredibly expensive across marketing, content, delivery, and product platforms. Our largest, most serious competitors were Showmax, Netflix, Amazon, and Iflix. Collectively, they easily invested $1 billion or more from 2015 to 2023.

During that period, we often had tense board meetings about why iROKOtv wasn’t succeeding; it was challenging to feel that all my hard work and dedication were constantly reduced to “you’re not doing enough”.

We have been, and remain, the most aggressive in trying to distribute content across Nigeria—deploying hundreds of manned kiosks, teams of outbound contact centre agents, creating agency networks, adjusting our product to prioritise Android downloads, and pioneering peer-to-peer file sharing.

At one point, it dawned on me, and I finally shot back in a board meeting: if iROKOtv was losing, could they point to someone who was beating us? In the startup world, that’s usually the outcome of underperformance.

You are simply being out-executed by a better-capitalised or higher-performing startup. In this case, there simply wasn’t anything anyone could point to to establish that.

So my simple assertion was that the market was winning. In 2019, we went out to fundraise; for the first time, we used a bank, Stanbic IBTP, to support that.

We were looking for $10-20 million to keep pushing into and across Africa with our outbound, agency, and kiosk models.

I believed my tales of survival would inspire the (primarily) PE investors that we were going to be the eventual winners in a brutal, long-fought civil streaming war. Instead, they all largely concluded that perhaps there was no market there, that the unit economics were simply not viable at any reasonable scale.

What they were all interested in was the ROK content, TV channels, and distribution business. It was straightforward (fewer than 30 employees), had clear revenue recognition (billion-dollar paid TV platforms – DStv, Multichoice, SKY, etc., with 3-5 year contracts in non-local currencies), and was amassing a sizable IP library funded by the same paid TV platforms. Once we separated out ROK, it was clear where the value lay in Iroko. It represented 80% of revenues and 25% of costs. EBITA margins of 35-40% were achieved without even realising it.

The outcome of that fundraise was the $25 million partial exit (Iroko sold her shares; Mrs Njoku remains a significant shareholder in the studio) to Vivendi/Canal+.

We closed in July 2019.

Before the end of 2019, we had distributed $5 million as a special dividend and were primed to take on the world.

Then COVID-19 happened. Streaming temporarily boomed in the West (our North American business tripled in subscriber growth), while Nigeria closed borders and grappled with peculiar economic principles (devaluations, FX windows, etc.).

The local market in Nigeria simply collapsed. We saw it and stubbornly decided to keep investing and doubling down until we were all tapped out, having burnt through most of the post-exit capital. To save iROKOtv, we considered crowdfunding, an AIM LSE listing (you could raise $10-30 million easily back then) with relatively little revenue but a strong narrative.

In the end, we raised $1.1 million in convertible notes, then recapped the company a year later and paid it back.

In 2023, we finally accepted there was no market for paid premium services and exited Nigeria. We haven’t processed any Naira payments there in almost two years.

As I humbly survey the wreckage of the last 15 years of streaming in Nigeria and Africa, it’s clear our (then $2k GDP per capita) was too small to support even a $5/mo product. It’s clear this wasn’t even a question of capital.

Showmax alone continues to pour tens, if not hundreds, of millions to make it work. But the global giants tapped out last year; their costs (content and marketing) were clearly unsustainably high, and their product needed to be localised to make sense and actually work; it’s just not how platforms sustainably scale.

So I wasn’t surprised when either Amazon or Netflix rolled back their considerable investments in Nigeria. $5/mo is a luxury I doubt even 250k can reliably afford in Nigeria.

You can see the impact of what GOtv and DStv are suffering at the hands of the market. It’s okay that we tried and failed. It’s okay that we accept the limitations in the domestic market we find ourselves in. Did it need $1B+ to figure this out?

Absolutely not. I believe, with my newfound knowledge, that iROKOtv could have reached the same conclusions with $5-10 million versus the $100 million+ we ended up investing.

In hindsight, streaming wasn’t the winning model for Nollywood in Nigeria. Content, channels, and distribution were.

With the economics that business had in 2018, we could have shut down iROKOtv and her $5 million/year in losses and either listed it or just had a fantastically profitable business.

But I was a believer and walked away from millions of dollars in personal liquidity to put it all in to build streaming in Africa.

My lessons were expensive, and that’s why I am so consistent in telling founders not to over-raise.

I am not surprised by the story of Obi from Kobo360; I lobbied him pre-$30m raise not to raise too much capital or later on to seek a merger with his nearest competitor whilst they were engaged in a brutal price war.

The unit economics and payment cycles were brutal, and capital wasn’t going to dramatically change the market dynamics, and it appeared that no one was really going to win that market. It’s only with deep, lived, and expensive experience that I can glance at unit economics coldly and get a feel for whether, with the usual macro turbulence, a startup has a better chance at long-term success.

Nigeria is currently a massive drag on the entire operating business of Multichoice. Their most recent H1 reports indicate.

Reminder that this is the largest pay platform in Africa, which is currently being acquired in a $2.8B deal.

Luka Modrić has announced he’s leaving Real Madrid after 13 seasons and 28 trophies.

His final game at the Santiago Bernabéu will be this Saturday. He’ll also represent the club one last time at the Club World Cup in the U.S. this summer.

A legend. A Ballon d’Or winner. A legacy that lasts forever.

Many people are letting emotions cloud their judgment when it comes to the recent drama surrounding Veekee James and a designer allegedly copying her work. While it’s natural to defend someone you admire, business—especially in today’s social media age—operates on strategy, not sentiment.

Here’s the truth: in fashion, smaller brands that mimic successful designers can pose a serious threat, no matter how established the original brand is. It’s not just about who came first or who is more “original.” Sometimes, the imitator uses the attention from that comparison to launch themselves into the spotlight.

That seems to be what’s happening here. The emerging designer may appear less skilled or less known, but he’s cleverly positioning himself to benefit from the controversy. He’s using Veekee’s fame as a springboard, and honestly, it’s a smart—if risky—move.

It only takes one celebrity endorsement to change everything. If a major name decides to give him a shot, and he delivers a bold, fresh design, the internet will explode. People will forget about who copied whom. Instead, they’ll say, “Wow, look what he did!” And unfortunately, Veekee could still catch criticism in the fallout.

That’s why I believe Veekee should’ve played it differently. Publicly reacting gave him the validation he needed. If she had stayed silent and let her legal team quietly handle things, he would’ve had less momentum. Instead, now he gets to be “the guy who copied Veekee”—and that alone could drive his visibility and sales.

In public relations, some individuals act like leeches. They latch onto bigger names, hoping to gain relevance by association. This designer might seem harmless now, but his entire strategy relies on the Veekee brand to boost his own.

And let’s be honest, the internet is emotional and unpredictable. The designer seems to know this—and he’s aimed his strategy squarely at a Nigerian audience that loves an underdog story. If he pulls off one standout piece for a celebrity, the same fans who supported Veekee could turn around and say, “See? He’s even better.”

Bottom line: don’t underestimate a small brand just because they look like they’re copying. Sometimes, that’s exactly the plan. In this game, staying calm, strategic, and legally smart is the best defense.

Veekee didn’t need to respond with emotion. She needed to respond with silence and strength. That alone would have disrupted his plan entirely.

My take on VDM.

VDM is finally winning the battle against EFCC and every other government security agency. The guy is pure ...dem no see anything on him I believe. But make we dey watch sha...but I believe he has won. If it is about Tax Evasion, worse case them go ask am to pay fines and if na money laundering, I doubt VDM would do that intentionally. If at all, it may be oversight error ( like transferring his own money abroad or internal without due process ) . So I see him winning in the end and MAY later be used as government informant. So to all his yahoo boys followers , you may want to watch out or you would become a pawn in this game of chess. IN ALL, I AM JUST SAYING, NOTHING OF FACT HERE UNTILL WE SEE THE CHARGES IF THERE IS ANY.

Full Time Results

Arsenal 0-1 PSG.

Arsenal though lost the but the played well considering their opponents.
If Partey was in that Arsenal midfield things would have been different. They control the game in the second half and were denied multiple times by PSG shot stopper Donnaruma.

The game was fair and i hope Arsenal stage a back in the second leg of this game , next week.

“I will expose Don Jazzy today. Everybody thinks Don Jazzy signed me after seeing the freestyle I did in 2022, where I looked like a street boy, but that’s not true. Don Jazzy actually discovered me in 2019. Before that freestyle, I had already been at Mavin’s Academy for three years. I joined in 2019 and even met Bayanni there. Don Jazzy looks for talent ahead of time and trains them at the academy. It’s honestly like a music school. Things don’t happen in the music industry by chance; they are all planned out years in advance. Don Jazzy told me to do those freestyles, and he even paid to have them promoted.” — Boyspice reveals!

I watched the video, and everything began to make sense!

Don Jazzy is way ahead of his time and knows how to play mind games with fans while branding his artists.

Respect! 🫡

Billionaire Jowi Zazza dated Sophie for 3years.

Once a girl can maintain a great body... She becomes only good for billionaires.

To use Ashawo raise over ₦2billion in networth is not that easy. For a billionaire to desire you, you must be topnotch. You must be clean, fancy and classy.

Billionaires really don't like sharing women. They don't f*ck with girls who broke guys f*ck with. It is just the game.

Ahaaa.. Palksa tiri gamee nay

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